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Impact of land administration programs on agricultural productivity and rural 
development: existing evidence, challenges and new approaches 
 
 
Jeremie Gignoux, Karen Macours and Liam Wren-Lewis1 
 
 
Abstract:  Investment in land administration projects is often considered key for 
agricultural productivity and rural development in developing countries. But the evidence on 
such interventions is remarkably mixed. This paper reviews the literature and discusses a 
number of challenges related to the analysis of the impacts of land administration programs, 
focusing on developing countries where the starting position is one of land administration 
systems based on the Napoleonic code, with existing individual rights that may be imperfect 
and insecure. We examine a set of conceptual and methodological challenges including : 1) a 
conceptual challenge related to the need to unbundle property rights and to establish the 
plausible causal chain for land administration interventions; 2) the existence of other binding 
constraints on productivity, implying the need to consider heterogeneities in policy impacts 
and the complementarity between property rights and other productive interventions; 3) the 
need to account for spillovers of land interventions on non-targeted households; and 4) 
methodological challenges related to the causal identification of the impacts of such 
interventions.  
 
Keywords: Land administration programs, property rights, agricultural productivity, rural 
development, impact evaluation methods. 
 
JEL codes: D23, O13, Q15  
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1 Introduction 
 
Insecurity of property rights is often argued to be an important impediment for agricultural 
productivity, and indeed more broadly for economic growth and prosperity. Land 
administration programs in many developing countries are designed to address such property 
rights insecurity, aiming at strengthening the rights of existing owners through clarification 
and formalization of individual rights, legislative changes, and/or improvements in conflict 
resolution mechanisms. Recent spikes in food prices have brought renewed attention to 
interventions that can increase agricultural productivity, and hence land administration 
programs might seem an attractive avenue for further investment. Yet while donors and 
governments have invested in titling and other land administration programs for a relatively 
long time, rigorous quantitative evidence on the impact of such interventions is rare, in 
particular for rural areas.  
 
Even more remarkably, the existing evidence is very mixed. The standard theoretical 
argument is that property rights can affect agricultural productivity through investment, credit 
and land allocation (Feder and Feeny, 1991; Besley 1995). But empirical evidence on impacts 
of land administration programs on investment and land allocation is inconclusive, and the 
existing evidence for credit, if anything, mostly suggests no impact. As a consequence, 
empirically it is far from clear whether, how, and to what extent such programs can contribute 
to improving agricultural productivity.  
 
This paper reviews the literature and discusses a number of challenges related to the analysis 
of the impacts of land administration programs that, we believe, can in part explain the mixed 
evidence, and the confusing implications that may be derived from them. We focus on a set of 
conceptual and methodological challenges including : 1) a conceptual challenge related to the 
need to unbundle property rights and to establish the plausible causal chain for a land 
administration interventions; 2) the existence of other binding constraints on productivity, 
implying the need to consider heterogeneities in policy impacts and the complementarity 
between property rights and other productive interventions; 3) the need to account for 
spillovers of land interventions on non-targeted households; and 4) methodological 
challenges related to the causal identification of the impacts of such interventions.  
The paper focuses on developing countries where the starting position is one of land 
administration systems based on the Napoleonic code, with existing individual rights that 
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may be imperfect and insecure.2  Such settings are found mainly in Latin America. While 
differences between regions have frequently been ignored in the literature, the reasons for 
insecurity, and hence the starting positions for land administration interventions, often vary 
substantially. For example, the underlying causes of land rights insecurity can be very 
different in regions such as Sub-Saharan Africa, where groups often have strong pre-existing 
rights, and where there might be a complete absence of a systematic land administration 
system. It is unclear to what extent lessons based on evidence from one institutional setting 
are relevant in another. That said, when discussing methodological challenges, we also draw 
on studies from other regions when they provide useful examples. 
 
The paper is organized as follows: section 2 reviews the theoretical and empirical literature 
on land administration interventions in contexts of developing countries with legal systems 
based on the Napoleonic code. Since the evidence remains inconclusive, we then focus on a 
set of challenges that can explain this assessment. Section 3 discusses several conceptual 
challenges including: a) the need to make explicit the links between interventions and 
changes in rights, b) the presence of other constraints on the outcomes of interest likely to 
reflect in heterogeneities in the effects of interventions, and c) spillovers of land interventions 
on non-beneficiary households and/or areas. In section 4, we then turn to the methodological 
challenges, discussing several methods to investigate the impact of property rights security 
and referring to previous studies. We discuss both experimental and non-experimental 
methods, highlighting the challenge of addressing selection bias and establishing causality. 
Section 5 concludes.  
 
 
2 Evidence on the effects of land administration interventions 
 
2.1 Unpacking property rights: which rights are changing ? 
The land administration interventions we consider may increase the security of property 
rights, strengthen existing but imperfect individual rights or possibly give transfer rights 
Interventions may attempt to achieve this through  institutional strengthening (including 
decentralization) of the cadastral and registration agencies, systematic regularization of all 
                                                          
2
 Other surveys have focused on land reforms in different contexts (Lawry et al, 2014; 
Vendryes 2012). 
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land parcels in a given area, introduction of digital information technology (IT) for managing 
cadastral and registry information, cadastral survey and mapping (happening typically at a 
disaggregate level), and property registration and land titling.  
 
There are several channels through which those interventions can change property rights, 
since property rights can be imperfect or incomplete in many different ways. Indeed, land 
rights are made up of a bundle of different rights, including the right to use land, the right to 
derive income from it, and the right to sell, and each of those rights can be imperfect. In order 
to understand how land administration interventions may have an impact, it is useful to 
distinguish how they might affect this bundle of land rights along three different dimensions: 
i) increased expected security; ii) individualization of land rights; and iii) facilitation of 
transfer.  
 
2.1.1 Increased expected security 
This includes any part of an intervention that makes the land rights less likely to be 
expropriated or contested, or that reduces the perceived likelihood of such events. Here we 
use expropriation to mean any transfer without the owner’s consent, with two typical forms 
of such transfer being to squatters/tenants, or someone else at the behest of the government 
(local or central). Interventions may increase the security of all land rights (e.g. by reducing 
the potential of conflict), or just of certain plots that were previously contested (e.g. by 
issuing plot specific documents).  
 
2.1.2 Individualization of land rights 
This includes any aspect of an intervention that transfers rights from groups (e.g. families, 
communes, or the state) to individuals. This individualization may be an individualization of 
usage rights, income rights or transfer rights. In settings with existing individual rights, the 
latter two are most common, with individualization likely to take one of three forms: a) 
individualization of family-owned land, i.e. land in co-ownership after inheritance3, b) 
individualization of government owned land that is already being used by an individual, and 
c) individualization of communal or collective land that is already being used by an 
individual. 
                                                          
3
 Note that this is in fact land that was fully individualized in the past (and often may have an individual though outdated 
title on the name of the ancestor).   
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2.1.3 Facilitation of consensual ownership transfer 
This includes any aspect of an intervention that reduces the transaction costs involved for 
owners of land to sell their land or control its inheritance. 
 
2.2 Mechanisms and evidence on direct outcomes 
The theoretical mechanisms motivating land administration interventions start from a set of 
assumptions about how changes in the bundle of rights above affect the direct outcomes of 
households that own the land and communities in which they live. One can distinguish five 
potential direct outcomes of land administration interventions: Investment, credit, transfers of 
effective rights, time allocation/labor and migration, and conflict. The empirical literature has 
focused on the impacts on these direct (intermediate) outcomes hypothesized by the 
theoretical literature.  
 
Below, we discuss the theoretical assumption and the empirical evidence for each of these 
five potential direct outcomes. Table 1 displays some of the key theoretical mechanisms 
through which changes to land rights can impact these outcomes. Table 2 gives an overview 
of the empirical evidence. While Table 1 separates out the three types of property rights 
changes indicated above, Table 2 only distinguishes between interventions that either mainly 
affect property rights security, or all 3 types of right together. We do so because empirical 
evidence separating impacts on only transfer rights or individualization is very scarce. 
 
2.2.1 Investment 
Perhaps the most frequently cited benefit of land administration interventions is that 
increased security will increase the expected time horizon of land-users and hence increase 
their investment. A slightly more subtle reason why investment may change is that certain 
investment activities may directly influence the probability of expropriation.  For example, 
leaving land fallow may increase the expropriation probability, or the planting of trees may 
reduce the probability. Hence interventions that increase security may reduce the need for 
these security-enhancing actions (de Meza and Gould, 1992; Sjaastad and Bromley, 1997; 
Goldstein and Udry, 2008). On the other hand, a potentially negative effect of increasing 
owners’ security on investment is that this may reduce the investment incentives of tenants 
who were hoping for beneficial expropriation (Banerjee and Ghatak, 2004; Besley and 
Ghatak, 2010). Individualization may also increase investment by reducing moral hazard 
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(Alchian and Demsetz, 1972) and the tragedy of the commons (Hardin, 1968) or 
underutilization that characterizes the one of anticommons (Buchanan and Yoon, 2000). 
Finally, transfer facilitation may also increase the expected time horizon, and hence 
investment, if it enables land to be passed on to a designated heir or sold on a market.   
 
Some previous evaluations of land administration interventions have found positive impacts 
on investment. Deininger and Chamorro (2004), Deininger et al. (2011) and Ali et al. (2011) 
have found investment alongside households reporting lower perceived risks of 
expropriation, and the range of investments in these studies suggest it is the greater expected 
time horizon that is the main channel. Castaneda Dower and Pfutze (2013) on the other hand 
attribute the greater investment they find to the `reduction in security enhancing actions’ 
channel, since the main investment they find to increase is leaving land fallow which, prior to 
the intervention, increased the risk of expropriation. In the same vein, de Janvry et al. (2012) 
find evidence that titling leads to a reallocation of investments in more productive land. As 
far as we are aware, no study has identified an impact on investment through 
individualization or facilitation of transfer. Moreover other studies find no effects of other 
titling interventions on investments (e.g. Fort et al. 2006). 
 
2.2.2 Credit 
Following the work of de Soto (2000) and others, it is hypothesized that interventions that 
facilitate the transfer of land to financial institutions and subsequent land transactions will 
increase the ability of landowners to receive credit. But empirically there is little evidence of 
an effect on credit of land administration interventions. Several studies have tested and 
rejected the presence of such effects (Deininger and Chamorro, 2004; Field et al. 2006). 
Possible explanations include the existence of credit rationing in the countries where impact 
evaluations have been carried out, or risk aversion on the part of landowners (Carter and 
Olinto 2003; Boucher et al. 2005). 
 
2.2.3 Transfers of land rights 
Land administration interventions may impact the frequency and nature of three types of land 
rights transfers: sales, rentals and non-financial transfers.  
 
a) Sales 
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Facilitation of rights transfer often focuses on improving the market for ownership rights. 
This is hoped to increase the transfer of land to owners who have a relative advantage, 
through exploiting economies of scale or a greater capacity for investment (Besley, 1995; 
Feder and Feeny, 1991). On the other hand, land may also be transferred to those looking to 
store value and those who are less risk-averse, which may not necessarily be welfare 
enhancing (Deininger and Feder, 2001).  The frequency of sales may also increase if owners 
use land as a liquid asset to smooth consumption. Interventions that increase expected 
security may increase sales since they are likely to increase the security of potential 
purchasers more than that of existing owners. Most empirical studies do not find an impact of 
land administration interventions on land sales. An exception is Castaneda Dower and Pfutze 
(2013), who find an increase in sales as a result of the Procede reform in Mexico. They 
suggest that this is likely to be due to an increase in demand from outsiders as a result of 
greater security. Lack of evidence for the `facilitation of transfer’ channel may reflects the 
lack of studies that look specifically at interventions focusing on this channel. 
 
b) Rentals 
Increased ownership security may make owners less fearful of renting out their land, and 
hence reduce the expected transaction costs of rentals (Conning and Robinson, 2007; 
Macours et al. 2010).  This reduction in transaction costs may also lead to rental contracts of 
longer duration, with more diverse partners and under different contract types. Indeed, several 
studies have found a positive relationship between property rights security and land rentals, 
including Alston et al. (2012), Castaneda Dower and Pfutze (2013), Deininger et al (2008), 
Macours et al (2010), and Macours (2014).   
 
c) Non-financial transfers  
Though land administration interventions are not typically aimed at transfers outside of 
market processes, this may be a potential impact. In particular, land administration 
interventions may transfer effective rights within the household, thereby empowering women 
or giving latter generations enhanced inheritance rights. An unintended consequence may also 
be the transfer of rights in cases of conflict, where rights may be gained by those that can use 
the intervention to their advantage. Empirically, Ali et al. (2011) find an increase in married 
women’s land ownership as a result of the intervention, which was one of the programme’s 
objectives. To our knowledge there is no direct evidence that land has been unintentionally 
redistributed through land administration programs, though this may be because it is not 
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generally looked for. A piece of indirect evidence is given by Selod et al. (2012), who find 
that in between knowledge of the intervention and its implementation, land security drops 
rapidly, suggesting perhaps that many owners fear a resulting redistribution. 
 
d) Time allocation and migration 
Greater security of ownership is expected to reduce the need to spend time on the land in 
question, and hence increase the time household members spend on other activities (Field, 
2007). This may include greater labor market participation and, in the extreme, migration 
away from the land in question. Transfer facilitation may also reduce the time spent by 
landowners on the land, since owners may be more able to sell or rent out their land rather 
than work on it themselves. Field (2007) and Moura et al. (2011) find empirical evidence that 
the land administration interventions they studied did increase labor market supply as a result 
of increased security. Galiani and Schargrodsky (2010) find related effects on the educational 
outcomes of children in households receiving titles. De Janvry et al. (2012) find evidence of 
increased out-migration as a result of a land administration intervention, but they do not 
distinguish as to whether this migration is of people who still own the land (and hence a 
result of increased security) or people who have transferred the land (and hence a result of the 
intervention facilitating transfer). 
 
e) Conflict 
Greater security of ownership may reduce conflict over land, since the increased certainty 
should decrease the payoffs of fighting over land.  Indeed, the process of providing greater 
security, e.g. through rights clarifications, might explicitly include efforts to resolve existing 
conflicts. Individualization may also reduce conflict amongst groups that previously jointly 
held rights to a piece of land, since the process clarifies the rights of individuals that may 
previously have been fought over. However, to the extent that stakeholders expect to see their 
claims recognized, the announcement of a clarification or individual titling intervention may 
spark latent conflicts in the short run. Facilitation of transfer may have ambiguous effects 
even in the long run.  On the one hand, a greater set of potential transfers may help to resolve 
conflicts in ways that were previously not possible.  On the other hand, the greater possibility 
of transfer may increase the returns to conflict for non-owners, as well as allow transfers over 
which there is discord. Evidence is lacking on those effects though, with the exception of 
preliminary evidence by Selod et al. (2012) of an increase in insecurity in the short run 
following a titling intervention in Benin.
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Table 1: Categorisation of theoretical work on land administration policies: Mechanisms and Direct Outcomes 
 Increased (expected) security  Individualization Facilitation of transfer  
Investment   Increases expected time horizon / 
reduces risk 
 
Reduces security enhancing actions 
(de Meza and Gould, 1992; Goldstein 
and Udry 2008; Sjaastad and Bromley, 
1997) 
 
Reduced effort of tenant farmers 
(Banerjee and Ghatak 2004, Besley 
and Ghatak 2010) 
Removes moral hazard (Alchian and 
Demsetz, 1972) 
 
Removes `Tragedy of commons’ / free-
riding -  (Hardin, 1968) and under-
utilisation of `anti-commons’ 
(Buchanan and Yoon 2000) 
 
Reduces economies of scale 
 
Use of low-risk low-return 
crops/technology 
Increases expected time horizon / 
reduces risk 
Credit Can be used as collateral (de Soto, 
2000) 
 
Increase in demand for credit  
 Can be used as collateral (de Soto, 
2000) 
Transfer of 
effective rights 
Increased leasing out (Conning & 
Robinson, 2007; Macours et al.  2010) 
 
 Consensual ownership changes to those 
with relative use advantage (i.e. better 
information, economies of scale, lower 
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transaction cost) (Besley, 1995; Feder 
and Feeny, 1991)  or those looking to 
store value and those less risk-averse 
(Deininger and Feder, 2001) 
 
Used as a liquid asset 
Time allocation 
and migration 
Reduction of security enhancing 
actions (Field 2007) 
Contracting problems may encourage 
self-use 
Can be sold / rented out by landowners 
Conflict Reduces potential returns to conflict Reduces previous ambiguity of rights Allows for transfer as a conflict 
resolution device 
 
Increases possibility of contested 
transfer 
 
Notes: Papers are classified according to the aspect of land right considered and the main direct outcomes the paper analyses. Impacts that are 
`positive’ (i.e. roughly equivalent to welfare enhancing) are underlined, and impacts that are negative are italicized.   
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2.3 Evidence on the impacts on final outcomes 
Whilst the above impacts are those that are most likely to result directly from land 
administration programs, they are not normally the ultimate objective of such 
interventions. Typically, it is hoped that positive impacts on the above direct variables 
will lead to improved final outcomes for farms and households, but also for broader 
communities (municipalities or higher level). The related empirical evidence is also 
summarized in Table 2. 
  
2.3.1 Agricultural productivity: yields, technical and allocative efficiency 
Productivity gains may result from the increased investment as well as from the transfer 
of land rights to other parties. For example, an increase in land ownership by those less 
risk-averse may result in more crops with `high-risk, high-return’ profiles.  At the same 
time, there is some risk that agricultural productivity may decline – for example, if land is 
transferred to owners who are using it mainly as a store of value, or if individualization 
increases the risk aversion of farmers. The evidence on the effects of titling and other 
land administration interventions on agricultural productivity and household welfare in 
the long run is scarce. Field and Torero (2006) consider a major titling program in Peru 
(PETT) and interpret the empirical results as effects on the type of production, with more 
land allocated to cash crops, but no effects on other agricultural investments, access to 
credit or land transactions leaving risk aversion potentially at play. 
 
2.3.2 Household consumption, income levels and stability, and food security 
For land rights holders, the largest impact on household consumption levels will probably 
come about through changes in agricultural productivity. Note however, that non-farm 
income may also be affected, particularly if there are effects on labor use, resulting for 
instance from new investments on land and changes in used agricultural technologies.  In 
the short-term, any observed increase in investment may come about through decreased 
consumption if households are credit constrained. In terms of consumption stability, 
greater access to credit and the ability to use land as a liquid asset may improve stability. 
Income fluctuations may, on the other hand, be greater if the intervention results in the 
adoption of riskier technologies and crops. Individualization of land may also reduce 
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risk-sharing amongst the group.  Finally, changes in land rights may alter the proportion 
of income received by various members within the household, such that it may be 
interesting to measure intrahousehold income allocation. At a household level, the impact 
of land administration interventions on food security is likely to be closely linked to the 
impacts on income and consumption. At a more aggregate level, total production of food 
is likely to follow changes in agricultural productivity. An important exception however 
may be in the case where land is moved away from food crops (for example, due to lower 
risk aversion). However, here again, the evidence is very thin. Field and Torero (2006) 
find no statistically significant effects on total household expenditure. 
 
2.3.3 Land values and asset ownership 
Increases in owners’ rights towards land should increase its value, whilst increases in 
renters’ rights may have the opposite effect. If the intervention means that land can now 
be used as a liquid asset, this may change households’ overall asset portfolio. For 
example, ownership of land may increase while the ownership of other liquid assets 
decreases. We are not aware of empirical evidence on those effects. 
 
2.3.4 Political support, increased tax base, and land use planning 
Beyond the household-level impacts, there a number of important municipal and higher-level 
policy impacts that may result from land administrative programs.  First, land reforms may have a 
significant impact on political preferences (Castaneda Dower and Pfutze, 2012; de Janvry et al., 
2013). Possible mechanisms may include lower dependence on local elites, support for the party 
that led the intervention or a greater participation in the market economy. Second, a more 
accurate and detailed cadastral and registry system will increase the ability of a government to tax 
land. Moreover, citizens may be more supportive in paying such a tax if they believe that the 
government is supporting their land rights. Third, land planning provides a number of important 
benefits, and is likely to be facilitated by clearer land rights.  One example is the provision of 
infrastructure, for which provision to insecure plots can be problematic.  While this mechanism 
may be more important in urban areas, it may also apply to a certain extent in rural areas in cases 
such as the provision of irrigation schemes. 
 
2.3.5 Natural resource protection 
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Though not typically considered as investment, similar mechanisms to those outlined 
above will work for non-depletion of existing assets. However, there may be a concern 
that individualization of land will disrupt existing mechanisms to preserve natural 
resources that are common to the group.  Moreover, increasing use of inputs such as 
fertilizers may have the side-product of increasing the pollution of water resources. Again 
we could not find empirical evidence on those. 
 
Overall, the empirical evidence on the potential benefits from titling and other land 
administration programs thus remains inconclusive. In particular, considering the main 
intermediary mechanisms posited there is mixed evidence of effects on investments and 
land allocation and, if anything, zero impacts found on credit. Moreover, the evidence is 
mostly lacking on agricultural productivity, and long-run outcomes such as household 
consumption and food security, land values, or natural resource protection. 
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Table 2: Categorization of impacts on intermediate outcomes in empirical work on land administration interventions/land titles in Latin 
America 
 Increased security  A combination of channels : security 
+individualization + transfer rights 
Investment 
(in physical capital) 
 
Reduction in security enhancing actions => increase in 
fallowing and land planted with perennials (Castaneda Dower 
and Pfutze, 2013) 
[Non-land investment not affected => no increased in current 
cultivation practices (Castaneda Dower and Pfutze, 2013)] 
 
Change in the relative returns to housing investment => 
improved housing quality (Galiani and Schargrodsky 2010) 
 
Spillovers (= learning from others + scale economies for 
credit institutions) => increased land-attached investments in 
areas with high titling density (Fort et al. 2006) 
[Individual titles have no effect on investment (Fort et al. 
2006)] 
 
Equality of moveable and land-attached investment returns 
rejected => moving closer to balanced investment portfolio 
=> increase in land-related investment (Deininger and 
Increased time horizon => export oriented-crops 
(Field et al. 2006) 
[No effect on other agricultural investments (Field et 
al. 2006)] 
 
End of “use it or lose it” rule => increased (Reduced) 
farmland in high- (low-) productivity areas (de Janvry 
et al. 2012) 
 
Longer contract durations => increased time horizon 
=> Tenants less likely to grow tree crops than owners; 
(Bandiera 2007) 
[Moral hazard => type of tenancy contract not 
correlated with tree cultivation (Bandiera 2007)] 
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Chamorro 2004, Deininger et al. 2011) 
Credit Increase in mortgaging but only for subsamples (Galiani and 
Schargrodsky 2010) 
 
[Importance of land as insurance? => no increase in access to 
credit; small increase in mortgaging probability (Galiani and 
Schargrodsky 2010)] 
 
Operational costs of providing loans => Positive relationship 
between opening of local bank and titling density (Fort et al. 
2006) 
 
[Investment not working through a “credit-market effect” 
(Deininger and Chamorro 2004)] 
[Possibility to put up land as collateral (Field et al. 
2006)] 
 
[Non-price rationing => No impact on formal credit 
market participation, except for land-rich households; 
impact even negative for poorest 40% in Honduras 
(Boucher et al. 2005)] 
Transfer of effective 
rights 
Increased  leasing out (Alston et al. 2012, Castaneda Dower 
and Pfutze, 2013; Deininger et al, 2008; Macours et al 2010, 
Macours, 2014)  
 
Non-transferable rights creating transfer uncertainty => 
Titling should increase both sales and rentals markets 
(Lanjouw and Levy 2002) 
Ability to buy and sell land => enhanced price 
responsiveness => Export oriented-crops (Field et al. 
2006) 
[Land transactions (Field et al. 2006)] 
 
[History of land reforms? => Increase in land market 
participation but very low level => Distribution of 
land operated almost unaffected (Boucher et al. 
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2005)] 
Migration, time 
allocation and 
investment in human 
capital 
Reduction in security enhancing actions => Increase in total 
household labor supply; reduction in probability to run 
business from home; reduction in child labor (Field, 2007) 
 
Increase in secondary and tertiary education (Galiani and 
Schargrodsky 2010) 
 
Reduction in security enhancing action => Increase in total 
household labor supply, significant only around and below 
the median (Moura et al., 2011) 
End of “use it or lose it” rule => Increased out-
migration (de Janvry et al 2012) – could be 
facilitation of sale or reduction in security enhancing 
actions 
Increased land / 
dwelling value 
High and significant titling premium; but insufficient to cover 
inheritance and other transaction fees (Galiani and 
Schargrodsky 2001 ) 
 
Transfer uncertainty => Important titling premium, however 
dampened by strong non-transferable informal rights 
(Lanjouw and Levy 2002 ) 
 
Increase in self-assessed land price (Deininger and Chamorro 
2004) 
[Value of dwelling (Field et al. 2006 )] 
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Agricultural 
productivity / Income / 
consumption / 
expenditure 
Reallocation of land to cash crops [but no effects on other 
investments and household expenditure] (Field and Torero 
2006) 
 
[No increase in household income, and household head 
income and employment status (Galiani and Schargrodsky 
2010)] 
[Household total expenditure (Field et al. 2006)] 
 
Politics and conflict End of vote suppression through expropriation => Increased 
total electoral participation and votes for opposition 
(Castaneda Dower and Pfutze, 2012) 
Electoral gratefulness for incumbent party (Castaneda Dower 
and Pfutze, 2012; mechanism unclear) 
Investor-class and vested interest theories => 
Increased vote share of pro-market party (de Janvry et 
al. 2013) 
[Theory of distributive politics => No “gratefulness 
effect” benefiting the incumbent (de Janvry et al. 
2013)] 
Natural resources (?)  
Gender [No effect on female labor supply (Field, 2007)] 
Weak informal rights =>  Female-headed households cannot 
rent out without ownership title but can easily sell, larger 
effect of titling on property value (Lanjouw and Levy 2002) 
 
Notes: Papers are classified according to the aspect of land right considered and the main outcomes the paper analyses. The potential links between 
mechanisms and measurable impacts that have been identified by theory. Impacts that are `positive’ (i.e. roughly equivalent to welfare enhancing) 
are underlined, and impacts that are negative are italicized. Characters in square brackets mean insignificant results, and simple characters without 
brackets indicate results that have indeterminate or unclear effects on welfare).  
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3 Impact evaluations and conceptual challenges 
 
The lack of conclusive evidence suggests that new approaches are required for better re-
examining this assessment and obtaining more conclusive evidence on the effects of land 
administration interventions. Those should address two sets of challenges.  
 
A first set of challenges to be overcome, before the methodological ones discussed in the 
next section, are raised by the conceptual analysis of the effects of land administration 
interventions. This analysis poses several difficulties related to: a) the links between 
interventions and changes in rights, b) heterogeneity in impacts notably due to other 
constraints on the outcomes of interest, and c) spillovers of land interventions on non-
beneficiary households and/or areas. 
 
3.1 Unpacking property rights: what are we evaluating?   
A first conceptual challenge is that property rights have several dimensions that can all 
(under certain conditions) be affected by a particular land administration intervention. 
Establishing the links between an intervention and the theoretical arguments on expected 
impacts, and deriving hypotheses related to the outcomes that can be expected to change 
and those that are unlikely to be affected, is key to gather meaningful evidence.  
 
In order to understand how land administration interventions may have an impact, it is 
useful to distinguish how they might affect the bundle of land rights along the three 
different dimensions discussed above: i) increased expected security; ii) individualization 
of land rights; and iii) facilitation of transfer. Some land administration interventions may 
only have impact through one of these channels. For instance, an increase in the capacity 
of the department responsible for land transfers may simply facilitate ownership transfer 
without increasing its security or individualizing any group held rights. However, in 
practice, land administration projects can often change the nature of the property rights in 
several ways simultaneously. For example, land titling could potentially operate through 
all three channels: security may be enhanced if titles increase the enforcement of existing 
individual or group rights; rights could become more individual if the previous de facto 
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arrangement was to treat the rights as belonging to a group (e.g. the family); and transfers 
may be facilitated if these are allowed by law but were previously prevented due to 
uncertainty. Which channels a particular project or policy works through will be 
determined by the specific components of the intervention, but also to a large extent by 
the country context. 
 
Table 3 below gives a potential mapping of the intervention types described above to the 
channels they are likely to work through. In each cell, we describe part of the necessary 
conditions for a particular type of intervention to act through each of the three channels 
identified above. The channels that operate will be very dependent on the exact nature of 
the intervention and the context in which it operates. A key first step in evaluating the 
impact of an intervention is therefore to identify the conditions under which each channel 
may operate. This will help focusing on the intermediate and final outcomes likely to be 
affected and identifying heterogeneity that could be useful to exploit in understanding the 
intervention’s impact.  
 
Table 3: Mapping of land administration interventions to possible channels  
 Increased expected 
security 
Individualization of 
land rights 
Facilitation of 
consensual ownership 
transfer 
Legal and policy 
changes 
Possibly, for instance 
changes facilitating 
ownership registration 
or verification, or 
changes reducing 
expropriation risk. 
Possibly, for instance 
changes granting 
individual use rights on 
communal land. 
Possibly, for instance 
granting of rights to 
rent and/or sell plots of 
land for which only use 
rights were previously 
held. 
Institutional 
strengthening 
(including IT) 
If previous institutional 
weakness led to lack of 
enforcement. Even 
then, effect is likely to 
be slow unless 
accompanied by 
If previous weaknesses 
led (in some cases) to 
use of group rights, and 
strengthened 
institutions enforce 
individual rights. 
If strengthened 
institution allows such 
transfers, and either (a) 
formal registration of 
transfers is easier, or 
(b) relative 
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information campaigns. enforcement of land 
that’s changed 
ownership is stronger 
Systematic 
regularization 
Yes If `irregular’ system 
involved use of group 
rights If transfer of 
regularized land is 
permitted and 
relatively cheap / easy 
  If transfer of 
regularized land is 
permitted  
Introduction of digital 
information 
technology (IT) for 
managing cadastral 
and registry 
information 
Yes, on longer term by 
keeping cadastral 
information updated 
No Yes, by facilitating 
updating of cadastral 
information reflecting 
transfer 
Cadastral survey and 
mapping 
Possibly, if mapping 
strengthens existing 
informal rights 
No, unless through 
sub-division of land in 
family co-ownership 
Possibly, if mapping 
strengthens existing 
informal rights 
Land-titling Yes Only if previous 
system involved use of 
group rights 
If transfer of titles is 
permitted and relatively 
cheap / easy 
Registration  If formal enforcement 
mechanisms are 
stronger than informal 
ones 
If formal enforcement 
mechanisms are 
stronger than informal 
ones, and informal 
mechanisms enforce 
group rights more than 
formal ones 
If transfer of 
registration is permitted 
and relatively cheap / 
easy, and formal 
enforcement 
mechanisms are 
effective 
Notes: Potential for specific land administration interventions (listed in rows) to affect different 
dimensions of property rights (listed in columns), and conditions under which such effects likely 
occur. 
 
Furthermore, economic theory has worked mostly on the question “what is the impact of 
a change in land rights?” and typically ignored the question “how do land administration 
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interventions affect land rights?” This absence is notable given that experience suggests a 
simple change in the law is neither necessary nor sufficient to change effective rights. An 
exception is Castañeda Dower and Pfutze (2012), who model how certification may 
enable a community to coordinate on enforcing a regime with different expropriation 
rules, and hence increase expected security. Perhaps partly resulting from this theoretical 
absence, studies rarely explore how a particular intervention changes land rights.  
 
For instance, while most empirical papers study interventions which are intended to 
increase expected security, there are a number of ways in which a given intervention may 
do so. Possible mechanisms include: 
(i) Providing information to land users on their existing rights 
(ii) Reducing the cost and/or increasing the expected probability of success in 
invoking central government enforcement in the case of future conflict (i.e. the 
courts) 
(iii) Coordinating local enforcement mechanisms 
(iv) Reducing the expectation of future land reform and/or government expropriation 
Establishing which of these mechanisms is at work is important to derive policy 
implications from studies of land administration interventions. 
 
3.2 Heterogeneity of impacts and complementarities with other interventions 
A second conceptual challenge stems from heterogeneities in the effects of interventions. 
The theoretical assumptions discussed in section 2 describe a range of possible impacts of 
land administration interventions. However, the empirical literature has shown that each 
of these impacts is not necessarily consistently found across interventions, even when 
carefully distinguishing how property rights are affected. This points to the fact that the 
standard models make a range of assumptions about the context from which the 
hypotheses on the link between land rights and outcomes are derived. Yet the 
assumptions are not necessarily relevant for all contexts. For instance, credit rationing 
may prevent both the increase in credit and the increase in investment predicted. Once 
such assumptions are relaxed in the theoretical models, they point to clear and rather 
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intuitive predictions on the potential for heterogeneous impacts along a variety of 
dimensions. 
 
In order to address these concerns and shed light on the relevance of context, empirical 
studies should explore heterogeneity in impacts across beneficiaries of a project, as a 
given land administration intervention is likely to have impacts that vary across plots and 
households. For example, Ali et al. (2011) find that the impact of the intervention they 
study is greater for female-headed households, whose previous land rights were likely to 
be the most insecure. Even if the change in rights is uniform across plots and households, 
there may be variation in impacts due to the necessary conditions for the mechanism to 
operate. For instance, Carter and Olinto (2003) show that the total investment impact will 
be greater for wealthier individuals in the presence of credit constraints. Exploiting such 
heterogeneity can give insights into the mechanism at work.   
 
In some cases, the presence of other binding constraints may even suggest the potential 
need to complement land administration interventions with other complementary 
interventions. For instance, in certain contexts, the potential for land administration 
projects to affect productivity might be limited by lack of access to new technologies or 
credit. When such complementary interventions can become incorporated in the overall 
project, or even when they are envisioned to occur in the same region and target 
population, evaluations can try to shed light on the possible complementarity of these 
interventions. While this can be very promising, further methodological challenges arise 
from the need to establish causal inferences regarding both the land administration and 
these complementary interventions, which we address in section 4.5. 
 
3.3 Spillover effects 
The discussion so far has focused on the impact of land administration interventions on 
households and areas targeted by the intervention. In addition to these direct effects, 
however, there are also likely to be spillover effects in areas not subject to the 
intervention.  These spillover effects, a third conceptual challenge, are important to 
consider for two major reasons. First, the spillover effects may be of intrinsic interest.  
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Second and methodologically, if the spillover effects impact upon a group that is 
considered as a `control’- and hence is implicitly assumed not to have been impacted by 
the program – this may complicate attempts to measure the impact of the intervention on 
those targeted. 
 
In the case of land administration interventions, there are several possibilities for 
spillover effects. One group of such effects is likely to be the result of anticipation 
amongst households not targeted. Since land administration interventions are generally 
sanctioned by the national government, it is very reasonable for non-targeted households 
to believe that they will be targeted in the near future. This belief is of particular concern 
for evaluating land administration interventions due to the importance of expected 
security in the mechanisms outlined above. An intervention such as land-titling may, for 
example, increase expected security even amongst non-titled households if they believe 
that in the near-future they will receive such a title.  On the other hand, for certain 
households, expected security may decrease if they believe that there is a high probability 
someone else may receive the title.  The two other channels discussed above - 
individualization and facilitation of transfers - may also potentially suffer from 
anticipation effects. If it is believed that an individual rather than a group will soon hold 
rights over a plot, group members behavior is likely to change in a variety of ways.  
Meanwhile, if it is believed that transfers will soon be facilitated, this may temporarily 
reduce land transfers, or households may change the way they use the land if they 
anticipate a future sale.  
 
Another set of spillovers that may occur are those that result from the relationship 
between land markets across both targeted and non-targeted areas.  If the intervention 
increases the probability of land being leased, those that lease the land may come from 
outside the targeted area. An increase in the value of land that benefited from the 
intervention may result in a decrease in the value of non-targeted land. Migration and 
labor supply decisions may also lead to spillover effects if they are large enough. This set 
of spillovers should be noted in particular when measuring the impact of interventions on 
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land transactions, since such transactions can easily involve households from outside of 
the treatment group. 
 
4 Methodological challenges 
 
Besides the conceptual challenges discussed above, another possible reason for the mixed 
evidence on the effects of land administration interventions is the large number of 
empirical studies that are likely to suffer from severe endogeneity bias. 
 
Indeed much of the empirical evidence is based on associational-based evidence from 
observational studies. These tend to investigate the correlations at a given point in time 
between the distribution of land rights and individual outcomes. In such observational 
studies, interpreting the relationship between land rights and outcomes as the causal 
effect of a specific policy change relies on strong assumptions, as many unobserved 
confounding factors could drive the observed correlations. For instance, landowners with 
formal titles usually differ in many ways from those without such documents, so that 
attributing their different behaviors and outcomes to their land ownership status is simply 
not credible.  
 
Selectivity into treatment is the main methodological challenge to be addressed. Because 
land tenure interventions tend to affect the rights of specific sub-groups of individuals, 
e.g. those with initially more insecure tenure or farmers in regions with a higher 
agricultural potential, the potential outcomes of beneficiaries with or without the 
intervention are likely to differ. Simple comparisons of the outcomes of beneficiaries with 
those of non-beneficiaries are thus unlikely to produce unbiased estimates of the 
intervention’s impacts.  
 
Rigorous evidence can only be produced if the evaluation data was collected in ways that 
carefully account for the allocation of treatment and allow identifying a comparison 
group that provides a valid counterfactual for the outcome of program participants in the 
absence of the intervention. If, in some favorable instances, natural experiments can 
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provide robust evidence, prospective impact evaluations of interventions are the most 
promising way for obtaining a valid comparison group, and thus credible estimates of the 
impacts of land interventions. Such evaluations may also allow isolating the impacts of 
specific changes in rights or examining complementarities that accrue when removing 
several different constraints. 
 
A prospective impact evaluation can be done by using experimental (i.e. randomized 
assignments) or non-experimental methods. Experimental methods require fewer 
assumptions and often provide a clean causal interpretation, but can be challenging to 
implement. For non-experimental methods, more assumptions will need to be made, and 
hence evaluations will require careful checking and the provision of evidence in support 
of the validity of these assumptions.  Below, we discuss the main options for impact 
evaluations, natural experiments, and ways to account for heterogeneities and spillovers. 
We refer to previous empirical studies and try to derive recommendations for future ones. 
 
4.1 Identification based on randomized assignment 
The most rigorous, and in some senses the most straightforward, way to assure that one 
can identify the causal impact of a land administration intervention is to assign the 
intervention randomly among a large group of villages or individuals that is eligible for 
the intervention. By making sure that assignment to the treatment group is independent 
from potential outcomes, randomized controlled trials (RCT) provide an adequate 
comparison group to the group of beneficiaries, i.e. a group from which one can learn 
about the potential outcomes of beneficiaries had they not been treated. In general, RCTs 
therefore provide the most reliable evidence on the causal effects of interventions. The 
general advantages of RCTs have been discussed in much detail elsewhere (e.g. Duflo, 
Glennerster and Kremer, 2008) and certainly hold for the case of land administration 
interventions.  
 
However, given the sensitivity of land rights in many contexts, political will is key to 
implementing a rigorous RCT of a land rights intervention. Moreover, the use of RCTs 
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for such evaluations raises several issues regarding implementation modalities and 
statistical power, internal validity issues, and external validity considerations.  
 
First consider implementation aspects. There are several ways to implement RCTs, and 
notably different possible units of randomization, and those have bearings for both the 
measurement of impacts and the operations. On the one hand, because land interventions, 
in particular those that seek to clarify rights, involve activities that are performed at the 
level of communities (such as information campaigns, surveying, conflict resolution), and 
because the externalities they generate between neighbors are likely to be strong (due for 
instance to changes in local land conflicts, anticipation of future eligibility, or land 
markets equilibrium), randomization generally must be conducted at the level of some 
sort of geographic cluster (which could be localities or communes).  On the other hand, to 
ensure the balance of characteristics between the two treatment groups and achieve a 
given statistical power, randomization needs to be performed at the level of sufficiently 
numerous (and thus small) areas. Thus, for land interventions with clarification activities, 
a design that accounts for both local externalities and statistical power may need to 
consist of several hundreds of geographic clusters. 
 
However, such RCTs may imply considerable constraints on operations. In most cases, it 
may seem difficult to implement a land intervention in dispersed small geographical 
clusters and not in other neighboring clusters. The typical solution is therefore to 
implement the RCT through the context of a staggered phase-in where control clusters 
would be incorporated in a second phase. Operations would then have to be adjusted to 
accommodate the RCT. In particular, the surveying and clarification operations that 
involve a pre-cadastral sweep of covered clusters have to be adapted to involve at least 
two sweeps. That will be easier to do when the program administration is centralized so 
that the schedule of phase-in is controlled.  
 
We are aware of only two RCTs having been implemented for evaluating the impacts of a 
land tenure intervention. The first is an ongoing evaluation of a pilot land surveying and 
certification program (“Plans Fonciers Ruraux”) implemented by the government of 
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Benin with support from the MCC. A preliminary impact evaluation was conducted by 
Selod et al. (2012). The randomization was conducted at the village level within each 
commune (the control group should benefit from the program when it will be scaled-up 
nationally).  Also in an African country, but now in an urban setting, Ali, Collin, 
Deininger, Dercon, Sandefur and Zeitlin (2011) have implemented a RCT for evaluating 
the variation of a titling component of a tenure securization program. The RCT was run 
in two urban slums in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, and consisted of providing access to 
formal land titles to informal settlers at randomized prices. The randomization into the 
treatment group was conducted at the level of ‘blocks’ (contiguous groups of 
approximately 40 parcels). 
 
The second set of issues to take into account relates to internal validity. Because some of 
the program components and effects are likely to affect behaviors of households and 
farmers whatever the cluster they live in, it is important to be able to distinguish the 
direct effects of the surveying and/or formalization of the plots owned by individuals in 
the treatment group from broader program and spillovers effects. Broader program effects 
are likely to occur in particular if public awareness and information campaigns on the 
importance of secure lands rights and responsibilities of land owners and occupants that 
precede the pre-cadastral sweep will cover the entire pilot communes. As little evidence 
is available on those, disentangling direct effects from indirect and/or spillover effects 
would be of interest (more on this below). 
 
The third set of considerations relate to the external validity of RCTs.  The specificities of 
the areas selected for the evaluation might limit the external validity of the results, as 
applies to any evaluation of a small-scale program.  A concern more specific to RCTs is 
the length of the experiment: the effects of land interventions can take time to appear, so 
that it is important to observe the outcomes of the treatment and control groups after a 
sufficiently long period of time. A staggered phase-in might put limits on the time before 
the control clusters are incorporated, while two to three years, depending on the context, 
seems a minimum to observe impacts on some investments (e.g. land improvements or 
tree planting) or income (e.g. perennial cultivations).  
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Fourth, unexpected political developments might complicate and possible endanger 
compliance with the experimental design. Given the political sensitive nature of land 
rights, it might be hard in the first place to convince government counterparts to agree on 
a randomized allocation. Moreover, once the intervention has started, local pressures 
might increase and demands by households in the control areas possibly could mean that 
the experimental control group also receives land rights, leading to contamination of the 
experimental design. On the other hand delays, logistical, administrative or political 
problems could imply that part of the treatment group does not receive the land rights in 
time. To avoid such complications, researchers conducting an evaluation will need strong 
buy-in from the implementation partners.  
 
In case there are program components that in theory could affect the whole population, 
but in practice might have limited impact without additional complementary 
interventions, the randomized addition of such complementary interventions can help to 
evaluate their impact. For example, it would be possible to randomize information about 
a certain legislative change that increases tenure security to analyze the impact of 
increased security. Similarly, it would be possible to randomize subsidies for a titling 
program that implies cost for individual households in such a way that increases 
(randomly) demand by households for such titles, thereby allowing an evaluation of the 
impact of titles. The evaluation in Tanzania referred to above uses such a design. Such 
evaluation designs are referred to as encouragement designs. While they allow 
establishing causality, they only show impacts for the population of people that change 
behavior because of the encouragement, and hence only allow estimating a local average 
treatment effect. In addition, they may have low statistical power, as take-up among the 
“encouraged” population might be low.  As such, they are not a first best strategy, but 
they should be considered as a possible option for components or interventions that 
because of their large scale or reach do not allow identifying another plausible 
counterfactual.  
 
4.2 Non-experimental prospective approaches 
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a) Regression Discontinuity Design 
In many cases, a second-best approach for obtaining credible estimates of impacts of 
titling interventions would be based on a regression discontinuity (RD) design (Lee and 
Lemieux 2010).  
 
The RD design can be applied for obtaining estimates of the impacts of land 
administration programs in several ways, depending on program implementation. For 
example, the targeting of land interventions might rest on some explicit criteria that are 
effectively enforced and generate a discontinuity in treatment assignment that does not 
correspond to any substantial differences between the two groups. For instance, some 
titling program might target smallholders cultivating parcels of a size below a given 
threshold, so that farmers with slightly larger parcels are excluded. In designing 
prospective impact evaluations, it is hence important to understand how the program will 
be targeted, based on which data eligibility will be determined, and whether there exist an 
eligibility rule for which such a threshold can be found. Indeed, prior to finalizing the 
program design, it can be helpful to introduce such thresholds specifically for the 
evaluation, for instance in making intended targeting rules more precise and in assuring 
that data will be systematically collected to apply those targeting rules. 
 
One application includes land surveying and titling interventions that are implemented at 
a small scale during a pilot phase covering areas delimited by precise borders, such as a 
few communes or municipalities. One can then compare the outcomes of individuals 
owning or exploiting parcels lying on the two sides of the borders. This approach was 
followed by Ali, Deininger and Goldstein  (2011) to estimate the impacts of a pilot land 
titling program in Rwanda. One concern with this type of discontinuity is that the borders 
of the selected pilot areas could correspond to specific geographical barriers (river or 
mountain range) that could be associated with changes in some determinants of 
agricultural production (such as climatic or soil conditions).   
 
Another potential application of RD can be when legal rules might generate thresholds 
determining which, and in what ways, different parcels or individuals are affected by the 
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intervention. Vranken et al (2011) thus consider the effects of the restitution of land to 
former owners and their heirs at liquidation of former communist cooperatives and state 
farms in the early 1990s in Bulgaria. They exploit the discontinuity generated by a law 
preventing excessive land fragmentation, which had plots below a given size (0.3 acres) 
remain undivided in co-ownership among the different heirs.  
 
A limitation of RD design estimates is their limited external validity. Indeed the effects of 
assignment to the intervention are estimated only locally around the threshold, i.e. for 
individuals that may have specific characteristics and do not compare well to other 
potential beneficiaries. For instance, estimates exploiting a geographical threshold would 
inform on the impact of an intervention for individuals with parcels of land near the 
border. One can then document the extent to which those groups look similar or differ 
from other potential beneficiaries. 
 
b) Difference in difference evaluations 
The main alternative non-experimental method consists in using comparison groups of 
non-beneficiaries who have similar (or sufficiently close) observable characteristics to the 
ones of beneficiaries of the land rights intervention. The program impacts are then 
obtained using regression or matching estimation econometric techniques.  As these 
evaluations rest on more assumptions, which by definition cannot be tested, they provide 
much less credible estimates of the intervention impacts. For assessing the validity of the 
comparison group and improving the quality of the estimates, it is critical to use both pre- 
and post-intervention data. Hence this type of evaluation, and the associated data 
collection, also has to be planned before the intervention.  
 
A difference-in-difference (DiD) scheme, possibly combined with matching, is feasible 
when an intervention is phased-in sequentially and the impact evaluation is planned 
sufficiently in advance, so that baseline data can be collected among some program 
participants before they benefit from the intervention. However, these evaluations require 
surveying large samples (see below), and ideally include data from multiple survey 
rounds, and may therefore be costly. 
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In a DiD setting, the key assumption is one of common trends, so that any unobserved 
factors that affect changes in outcomes would affect in the same ways the changes in 
outcomes of treatment and control individuals.  This assumption, which is related to the 
one of unconfoundedness used in simple regression or matching models, is not testable. 
Any unobserved heterogeneity that is not time invariant would lead to different trends 
and hence bias the results. For instance, suppose that land titles have been delivered first 
in poorer areas and that some catching-up would be taking place independently of the 
intervention. In this case, farmers' productivity and income would increase faster in those 
areas, and this would bias the estimates of the effects of titling. Variations in climatic 
conditions could similarly drive differences in trends. Moreover, identifying potential 
beneficiaries at baseline in control areas will be key to control for individual selection 
into treatment, which represents a challenge as soon as the treatment depends on 
beneficiaries' characteristics and potential outcomes. Matching estimates can increase the 
plausibility of the common trend assumption when the probability of benefiting from an 
intervention differs a lot across the treatment and comparison group (i.e. overlap is 
imperfect). However, the comparison group will be likely poorer when it is drawn in 
geographical areas that are more remote from the treatment areas, or in different 
administrative divisions, and in this case it will be more likely that confounding factors 
drive some different trends in the two groups.  
 
Several non-experimental studies of the effects of titling interventions have relied on DiD 
estimates. Field, Field and Torrero (2006) for instance investigate the effects of the 
Special Rural Cadastre and Land Titling (PETT) program, which was implemented in 
Peru starting in 1993 and consisted in a complete securization process with surveying and 
titling of parcels and establishment of a cadastre in rural areas. Zegarra et al (2007) 
combine matching with DiD estimates for the same program. And de Janvry,  et al. 
(2012) examine the effects on migration of Procede, a large-scale land certification 
program implemented in Mexico from 1993 to 2006. 
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The identification assumption is not testable, but its plausibility can and should be 
assessed. One approach for this consists of testing for the presence of pre-intervention 
trends (similar to a pseudo-outcome) when data is available for several points in time 
prior to treatment (e.g. de Janvry et al, 2012, 2013). Another approach (similar to a 
pseudo-treatment) consists of testing for differences in outcome changes across different 
sub-groups of control individuals, e.g. two groups of areas that will be covered by a land 
titling intervention at two different future dates. 
 
4.3 (Non-prospective) natural experiments 
A last type of evaluations, which consist of exploiting sources of arbitrariness in the 
allocation of treatment, can be performed in some favorable settings. In certain cases, 
whether some individuals are treated by a policy intervention depends on some 
exogenous factors that are independent from the potential benefits and costs treatment 
would incur for them. For instance, in the case of land titling programs, some arbitrary 
rules in program administration might determine which areas are treated first and which 
ones only later without an explicit targeting based on observable characteristics and 
related to potential outcomes. Castaneda Dower and Pfutze (2013) thus argue that, for the 
Mexican certification program Procede, the timing of the first contact made by program 
staff with Ejidos was determined without an explicit targeting strategy, but mainly 
depending on distance to the state capital where the staff were based (which they assume 
is not associated with potential outcomes of program beneficiaries). In other instances, 
whether the program is actually implemented or not depends on factors that are 
independent from individuals’ choices and outcomes. Galiani and Schargrodsky (2010) 
study the case of squatters who occupied from 1981 urban land that they partitioned into 
small parcels; while the squatters believed the land belonged to the state, it was actually 
private property of 13 landowners. In 1984-1986, the Congress of the Province of Buenos 
Aires passed a law to expropriate these parcels and allocate them to the squatters with a 
monetary compensation to the former owners, but, while 8 owners immediately accepted 
the expropriation and associated compensation, the other 5 contested the decision in 
courts. As a result, some squatters obtained formal land titles in 1991 while others had to 
wait until the dispute was settled in 1998. Other historical accidents, such as political 
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changes affecting the content and implementation of interventions, might provide similar 
conditions for “natural experiments” whereby some exogenous factors influence the 
allocation into treatment. 
 
Natural experiments allow the identification of the causal effects of interventions for 
subpopulations that have their treatment status modified by the exogenous factor. While 
these subgroups are not necessarily the most interesting, they can nevertheless provide 
internal valid evidence on the local effects of some land administration interventions. 
 
4.4 Measuring and controlling for spillover effects 
While the evidence remains limited, measuring and controlling for spillover effects 
should be an important part of evaluating the impact of any land administration 
intervention, and the data collection strategy must account for this. One way of doing so 
is to consider heterogeneity amongst the control group, particularly spatial heterogeneity 
if it is believed that those closer to the targeted areas are more likely to feel spillover 
effects.  In practice, a smart design that combines two control groups, with and without 
exposure to externalities, can allow both to identify an intervention’s impact and to detect 
externalities. Anticipation effects may also be measured by having one control group that 
knows it will be treated in future, and another one that does not. The optimal way to 
ensure such heterogeneity may be through using a two-stage randomized control trial. In 
this case, the evaluators first randomly select geographical areas to be benefited by the 
intervention (in which the spillovers are more likely to take place) and then within these 
areas they pick individuals or smaller areas that will benefit directly from the program.  
 
4.5 Complementarity with other interventions 
Heterogeneity analysis can be done by estimating impacts for specific subgroups (e.g. 
large versus small farmers). Yet the identification concerns are equally relevant for 
heterogeneity analysis. In order to rigorously explore heterogeneity, potentially 
interesting variables should thus be identified prior to sampling and the sample stratified 
on those variables, e.g. if we are interested in the differential impact of titling on female 
owners, the sampling frame should purposely include enough female owners.  
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When heterogeneity of impacts is expected to depend on interactions with other 
interventions, impact evaluations can go one step further and specifically analyze the 
complementarity between interventions, by defining strategies to identify the causal 
impact of each of the interventions and of the interactions. For instance, if the impact of 
titling on credit uptake is expected to depend on the availability of credit, a simultaneous 
evaluation of a titling and a credit intervention would be needed, designed in a way that 
allows separating their effects and consider their complementarity. When evaluations are 
designed prospectively, and especially when randomized allocation is an option, two 
interventions could notably be randomized orthogonally on each other.4  
 
5 Conclusions 
 
We have reviewed studies of the effects of land administration interventions on 
agricultural productivity, household welfare and local development. While theoretical 
models have produced strong predictions on the effects of titling and related 
interventions, the empirical evidence of those effects remains mixed. More empirical 
studies and innovative approaches are thus required to obtain more conclusive evidence 
on the effects of those interventions.  
 
This paper discussed a number of challenges to be addressed by those studies.  We first 
focused on a set of conceptual challenges to be overcome when analyzing of the effects 
of land administration interventions. One such challenge relates to the need to unbundle 
property rights that encompass several dimensions, including the level of security they 
provide, whether they are individual, and their transferability.  A key first stage will be 
asking how the interventions of interest, and its specific components, may change 
effective land rights and, based on theoretical models, how the changes in land rights lead 
to changes in intermediate and final outcomes. Identifying the conditions under which 
each channel may operate will help the data collection be tailored to the potential 
                                                          
4
 Gignoux, Macours and Wren-Lewis (2013) describe a possible example. 
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mechanisms at work. Then, to understand which components of an intervention have the 
largest effects, and what are the mechanisms at work, it is also important to collect data 
on intermediate outcomes, such as conflicts and perceived security, agricultural practices 
and other labor activities, investments, financial and land transactions. In addition, 
evaluation designs should plan for explaining the non-results as well as the potential 
positive results. This is particularly relevant for land administration programs, for which 
the available empirical suggests that expected impacts seem often lower than what would 
be theoretically expected. 
 
We then insisted on the existence of other binding constraints on productivity, implying 
the need to consider heterogeneities (across space or households) in the effects of 
interventions, and the complementarity between property rights and other productive 
interventions. Methodologically, RCTs allow examining heterogeneities and evaluating 
(notably through orthogonal randomizations) the separate impacts and complementarities 
of different interventions, e.g. property rights and agricultural development interventions 
(such as subsidies, access to credit or extension). 
 
Spillovers also constitute a conceptual challenge. They can occur when non-targeted 
households believe they will be treated in the future or through the equilibrium of land 
(or other, e.g. labor) markets. While the existing evidence is limited, empirical studies 
should plan to document these effects, notably through designs that allow their 
identification, e.g. by controlling for information release of the local density of treatment.  
 
We then discussed the methodological challenges related to the causal identification of 
the impacts of such interventions, and suggested several ways for addressing those. Smart 
designs combining several methods might be needed to obtain rigorous estimates of both 
short and long-term results, and both are key for good evaluations of land titling 
programs. RCTs bring strong internal validity, and can be complemented with non-
experimental control groups for evaluating long-term impacts. This will also allow testing 
for the presence of possible spillovers and side-effects (e.g. information campaigns) of 
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interventions. Studies based on a RD design and natural experiments can also in some 
favorable cases provide rigorous evidence. 
 
High quality monitoring and administrative data are also necessary inputs for good 
impact evaluations, as it will allow documenting what exactly happened in terms of the 
implementation of the interventions on the ground. In addition, qualitative data 
evaluations designed to be complementary to the quantitative evaluations can allow 
answering how the intervention affected expected outcomes. Given the complexities in 
the causal chain related to land titling programs (where latent conflicts and perceptions of 
tenure insecurity can sometimes be hard to capture in quantitative surveys) this can be 
especially important. 
 
Studies of the effects of land administration projects can serve not only to evaluate the 
overall impact of interventions, but also to provide information on their optimal design, 
allow comparison of different designs and possible sequencing, and provide the 
opportunity to test complementarities with other interventions. This can make  
them more relevant for policy makers. It also makes them more attractive for research, as 
it opens the black box, sheds light on mechanisms of impact, and therefore provides 
information on generalizability of results. 
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